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ABSTRACT
The annual change in the value of an in-ground mineral is equal
to the increase or decrease of inventories ("reserves"),
multiplied by the market value of a reserve unit. The limited
shrinking resource base does not exist. Its inter-generational
optimizing is a phantom problem. If there is any "Hotelling
rent" it is captured by the reserve market value, which is
created by investment in knowledge (exploration) and in
productive facilities (development). There are problems of
concepts and data. But examples for recent years suggest that
mineral value changes are small.
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To reckon the sustainable national product in any year, we
must subtract the value of assets used up in that year. This
paper covers mineral assets, particularly oil and natural gas.
For this task, we need a theory of mineral values and depletion.
A paper published ten years ago (Boskin et al 1985)
calculated the value of the U.S. Government's mineral assets,
mostly oil, by taking 1981 prices and assuming they would
increase by 3 percent real, i. e. by 43 percent by 1993. In fact,
the real oil price fell about 70 percent. The overstatement is by
a factor of 4.8. Then the authors discounted future income at a
riskless 2 percent. If one uses a conventional 10 percent, that
shows overstatement by a factor of 5, or a total overstatement of
24 times. This was no aberration. It followed what is still the
received theory of mineral depletion.1
The received theory In its current professional form the
doctrine now comprises a large body of theory and econometrics,
i This paper is a shortened and re-written chapter from a
forthcoming book, The Genie Out Of The Bottle: World Oil Since 1970
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995). It draws on The Economics of
Petroleum Supply (Cambridge: MIT Press 1993), particularly chapters
11-13, and on a paper, "Finding and Developing Costs in the United
States 1945-1986", in John R. Moroney, ed., Energy, Growth and the
Environment: Advancement in the Economics of Energy and Resources,
vol. 7. (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1992) For other works
referred to, see Note on Sources.
and a systematic treatise by DasGupta and Heal (1979). There are
many variations on a simple and apparently self-evident
proposition.
There is only so much of the mineral resource. Every unit
used today means one less for the future. As the finite stock
shrinks, its value rises. The owner must find the optimal way to
ration it out, the correct rate of exchange between present and
future use. If conduct is rational, the present value of any
barrel in the ground must equal that of every other barrel,
regardless of when the barrel is to be produced. Otherwise it
would pay to shift the barrel from a lower-value year to a
higher-value year. As compensation for keeping the asset in the
ground for later use, the price must rise at the "appropriate"
discount rate. It follows, and is basic to the theory, that the
value of a unit in the ground is equal to the current price, net
of operating cost.
What is the correct discount rate for discounting a flow of
output from a deposit in ground? Market discount rates will not
do, because they relate to the supply and demand for investible
funds. But the distinguishing mark of a mineral resource is that
it precedes investment. The value is born not made.
Some economists think the time to exhaustion is so long that
market prices of mineral assets do not express real scarcities.
The market cannot work. Even those who do not go that far still
seek a rate unrelated to investment and investment risk, as did
(Boskin et al). The appropriate interest rate is considered as
the riskless rate or perhaps a "social discount rate" to be
evolved by some kind of political process. Higher discount rates
means faster depletion, threatening social catastrophe.
Applying the theory runs into problems. First, mineral
prices should rise over time; in fact, the trend is if anything
down. Second, if the value of the in-ground barrel equalled its
current net price, that would be a very convenient rule of thumb
for the oil industry. In fact, there has been a rule of thumb for
many years: a barrel in ground is worth one-third the gross
wellhead price, or half the net price.
Moreover, since it should not matter whether the barrel is
sold early or late, a barrel which is to be produced quickly
should be worth no more than one which is to be produced slowly.
Yet papers written forty years ago--I regret that there is
nothing more recent--show clearly that a reserve with a high
production: reserve ratio sells for more than a reserve with a
low ratio. This can be shown to make good sense. (See Appendix
Par 3, and Adelman 1993, page 228)
Mineral depletion theory restated The physicist Max Planck
once described "phantom problems". One of them "used to keep many
a great physicist busy for many years: the study of the
mechanical properties of the luminiferous ether." (Planck 1949,
p. 56) In time, physicists decided they could not find the
luminiferous ether, they did not need it, and had best forget it.
(As chemists had forgotten phlogiston.)
Particularly after 1970, the study of "an exhaustible
natural resource...a fixed stock of oil to divide between two or
more periods" (Stiglitz 1976) and the "basic upward tilt" to the
price, kept some fine economists "busy for many years". But the
fixed stock is like the luminiferous ether--it isn't there. Its
optimal allocation over time to do justice as between us and our
posterity is a phantom problem.
No mineral, including oil, will ever be exhausted. Only a
portion of what is underground will ever be extracted. If and
when the cost goes above the price which consumers are willing to
pay, the industry will begin to disappear. How much was in the
ground before extraction began, and how much is left when it
stops, are both unknown and unimportant. The amount extracted
depends from first to last on
cost and price, nothing more. CURRENT PRODUCTION
Curves like Figures 1,2
please the eye and sum up the
history of many industries. On the
horizontal is time, on the .
vertical is production. The upper I
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and the lower cumulates it up to
the end of each period. The
cumulative curve first grows at
an increasing rate, then flattens
to approach the limit.
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For 1948-1990, the graphs Figure 2
are a fairly good picture of the production of 331/3 RPM
phonograph records; for 1953-2000, of production of mainframe
computers, which IBM expects will cease by the end of the decade.
[Wall Street Journal 9-12-94:B4] As was pointed out 60 years ago,
most manufacturing industries have followed similar curves,
whereby the rate of growth at first increases, then declines.
(Burns 1934) Nobody suggests that the total cumulative output of
a manufactured product over time is somehow fixed in advance, and
must stop when there is "nothing left to produce."
The cumulative amount cannot be estimated in advance, unless
future costs and prices are known. A forecaster might extrapolate
the growth of phonograph records or mainframes (or vacuum tubes,
typewriters, horseshoes, whale oil, etc.) into a logistic curve,
based on his gut feeling for prices, costs, and how long it would
take until the product was displaced by something better. He
could be right, for people may know much more than they can
prove. But there would be no way to tell. A logistic curve for a
mineral industry is no different.
Reserves=inventories Mineral production is a flow from an
unknown physical resource, first via exploration into identified
"fields" and "reservoirs," then via development into current
inventories or "proved reserves," to be extracted and sold.
Reserves are renewable and constantly renewed, if--and only if--
there is enough inducement to invest in creating them. The
illusion of a fixed resource, forever running down, hides the
real problem.
The real cost-price problem There is a good reason why the
costs of renewing mineral reserves should keep rising, and prices
with them. All else being equal, the larger more accessible
fields would be found first, even by chance. Once found, the
better deposits (lower cost or higher quality) would be developed
first. As mankind went forever from good to bad and from bad to
worse, minerals should become ever more scarce, and prices rise.
What really happens is shown in Figure 3: six important
metals over 50 years. A simple time trend shows three
statistically significant decreases (aluminum, lead, iron ore);
one significant increase (tin); one borderline decrease (zinc)
and increase (copper). There is an endless tug-of-war,
diminishing returns versus increasing knowledge, which includes
formal science and technology in a two-way interaction with a
vast amorphous body of know-how.2 Mankind has won big--so far. I
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think our successors will wonder why it took economists so long
to see that the ghost of mineral scarcity should be laid to rest
along with the ghost of land scarcity.
One should not think of Figure 3 as "three downs, one up,
two undecided, the downs have it". What it really shows is that
over time each mineral price has fluctuated as one or another
force has dominated. Therefore a unit in the ground is a risky
asset. The discount rates which govern holding it, or creating
more of the same, are risky rates .
CREATING OIL RESERVES
A new well can produce an initial daily amount, which will
decline over time because of pressure loss, water encroachment,
etc. (Additional investment in "enhanced recovery" may bounce the
output back up.) Operating expenses per well are fairly constant,
hence cost per barrel must rise as output declines. When it just
equals the market value of the output, production stops at the
"economic limit." The estimated aggregate output of the new
wells over time is the "proved reserves added" or "reserves
booked".3 This is the marginal cost of providing inventory. The
unit value and the marginal cost of renewal constantly gravitate
toward each other throughout the market network.
In the United States, annual reserve estimates are accurate
enough to permit estimating the annual net and gross additions to
reserves. There are also reliable data on the expense of drilling
and connecting new wells. Until 1992, we also had a record of
non-drilling investment outlays. Investment data do not always
closely match the reserve data, but one can estimate cost per
additional barrel added, year by year, over a long period, within
tolerable error limits.
Reserve growth in a field Once a field is found, reserves
are created over time. In California, the Kern River field was
discovered in 1899. In 1942, after 43 years of depletion, its
"remaining reserves" were 54 million barrels. In the next 44
years it produced not 54 but 736 million barrels, and had another
970 million barrels "remaining" in 1986. The field had not
changed, but knowledge had--science, technology, and not least,
the detailed local geology learned by development.
In England, as the onshore Wytch field was developed, it was
perceived to extend under the sea. A 1991 development plan for
drilling the undersea section from an artificial island was
rejected because it was in a scenic area. Two years later the
undersea reservoir was reached by drilling horizontally from the
onshore, to a record length. The investment was actually 56
percent less than with the island. (Oil & Gas Journal, January
3, 1994, p. 30.) Wytch reserves will be increased accordingly.
These examples are unusual but help us understand how most
reserve creation is in old fields, and how reserves eventually
booked are many times the initial estimate.
Persian Gulf A special expert mission estimated Persian
Gulf reserves in 1944 at 16 billion barrels proved, 5 billion
probable. By 1975, those same fields, excluding later
discoveries, had already produced 42 billion barrels and had 74
9billion "remaining". Both numbers are much larger today, but not
published. Indeed, since 1981, we no longer have even current
Gulf production by fields. We cannot tell when fields grow
together into one, as several grew into the Saudi giant Ghawar.
But Gulf discovery effort has been small. Probably most output
is still from those pre-1944 fields. Cumulative 1945-93 Gulf
output was 188 billion barrels, nine times the 1944 estimate. At
end-1993, Gulf "remaining reserves" were 663 billion--estimated
more generously than they would be in the USA.
"Ultimate reserves" Along the way, predictions of
"undiscovered" or "ultimate" reserves have repeatedly been made,
and surpassed, sometimes with embarrassing speed. At end-1984, it
was estimated that there was a 5% probability of another 199
billion barrels remaining to be added at the Gulf, ever. Within
five years, it had already happened.
These "ultimate reserves" are implicit forecasts: how much
it will be profitable to find, develop, and produce, given
current costs and current knowledge. The estimator of "ultimates"
is doing economics without knowing it. We pointed out earlier
that a forecast may be right,4 but we cannot tell. As knowledge
grows, so do the "ultimates".
United States In the United States, crude oil discovery
peaked in 1930, when proved reserves were 13 billion barrels. In
the next 60 years, the US ex-Alaska produced 130 billion. The
inventory turned over ten times and is today about 17 billion
(with another 6 in Alaska). Many small fields were found. More
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important was the continuing expansion of old fields. In 1966-
1977, the only years when comparison is possible, 19 billion
reserve barrels were added, of which 17 billion were in fields
discovered before 1966.
These huge new reserves in old fields were no gift of
nature. They were a growth of knowledge, paid for by investment.
This history explains why today in various parts of the world
there is interest in letting foreign companies develop so-called
"marginal" fields. Much oil can be added in these fields, an
additional return on the knowledge gained by operators elsewhere,
especially in the USA.
The sensing-selection instrument At any given moment,
reserves are being added everywhere. The industry is a great
sensing-selection instrument, scanning all deposits, old and new,
to develop the cheapest increment or tranche into a reserve. The
reserve-increments of any given period are overwhelmingly in
existing fields. Nobody "finds" a reserve, just as nobody finds a
factory. Oilmen find new fields, then new reservoirs in old
fields, and new strata or pools in old reservoirs. Development
usually leads to discovery just as discovery usually leads to
development. The constant search for least-cost prospects takes
the industry to the fringes of known reservoirs, and beyond it.
The search process is driven by cost comparison.
PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COST
In a brief treatment, we can safely neglect operating costs,
and treat them largely as a subtraction from price. Development
investment expenditures are made to drill and complete wells,
install equipment, and connect to a pipeline or tanker terminal.
Marginal development investment is the amount spent per barrel
newly booked into reserve inventory, or per barrel of newly
installed capacity. (Endnote 3 shows the conversion between
reserve-additions and capacity-additions).
The harder we squeeze a sponge, the less the additional
liquid from squeezing still harder. The more intensive the
development of a reservoir, measured by the ratio of production
to reserves, the higher the marginal cost per unit. Development
expands reserves and capacity so long as the cost is below the
value.
But the value, allowing for location and quality, is the
same for all pools because it is derived from the market price.
Therefore, over any area where capital can flow freely, marginal
cost in every single project is in competition with marginal cost
in every other project. Under competition, operators keep
expanding the better projects most, driving marginal costs up
toward equality everywhere.5 But the average cost, the total of
all expenditures made from the start, divided by the total of all
reserve barrels added from the start, varies enormously among
pools. The rent per barrel produced, which is the difference
between marginal and average cost, will vary even more, and there
is no reason to expect equality, ever.
If the process continued indefinitely, lower-cost wells
would expand most. Their marginal cost would rise until it became
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equal everywhere. This result is postponed as new choices appear.
The discount rate (return on investment) Return on
investment drives the whole process of reserve-addition. Since
there is no pre-existing stock, there is no pre-existing value.
The discount rate in any given kind of oil development is
governed by risk, as in any other investment.
More intensive development means a higher ratio Q/R,
production to reserves. This raises the required investment per
barrel. But--it speeds up the inflow of revenues, and raises
present value. A higher discount rate penalizes slower depletion.
It also raises the operator's cost of investing more to deplete
faster. Thus it makes quicker depletion more desirable, but less
accessible.
Macbeth's porter said of strong drink: "Lechery, sir, it
provokes and it unprovokes. It provokes the desire, but it takes
away the performance." So too, a change in the interest rate
affects development both ways, to speed it up and to slow it
down. The net effect is probably small.
DEVELOPMENT COST, IN-GROUND VALUE, FINDING COST, "SCARCITY RENT"
Substitution among development, purchase, discovery
Operators invest in a wide gamut of projects: improved recovery;
more wells into the same pool; wells into adjacent strata or
adjacent pools; prospects which are completely known; less
completely known ... and so on to the deliberate search for new
reservoirs and new fields or even new "plays" in new areas
expected to contain an array of fields. "Development" shades
into "exploration", or in French recherche, i.e. research.
All these methods of reserve-addition are imperfect
substitutes for each other, and all are in competition. If
development is becoming more expensive, it pays more to explore
for new pools and fields to freshen the mix and moderate the
increase in development cost. Conversely, if the newly-found
fields are getting smaller, deeper, more heterogeneous and
faulted, etc. then development cost per unit of reserves booked
into those new fields will be higher. This pushes operators
into drilling more wells into and around the older pools, and to
drain the older pools faster. Thus higher finding cost is
registered in higher development cost.
But there is no way to calculate past finding cost per unit.
(A popular expedient, "finding cost (or replacement cost) per
barrel of oil equivalent" is well worth avoiding. See Appendix
Note 2.) Annual exploration expenditures in the USA were
tabulated in 1955-1991, but we have hardly an idea how much was
discovered in a given year. A discovery engenders a stream of
reserve-additions over decades, perhaps over more than a century.
At any moment, operators calculate the odds on finding a new pool
of a given size and development cost in a given place. There is
no way to aggregate those estimates, even if we knew them.
So finding cost is a blank, but there is often a proxy. An
alternative to adding reserves by any combination of developing-
finding is simply to buy them. Reserves of oil and gas are
frequently bought and sold, as are companies which own them.
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Hence the market value of developed reserves is comparable to the
cost of all other methods of reserve-addition. Because all are
substitutes, changes in the cost of any are an indicator of
changes in the cost of all the others.
Increasing oil scarcity means increasing values and costs
across the board. A higher cost of finding and developing raises
the value of a barrel already developed. Conversely, a higher
value of a barrel in the ground is a greater incentive to invest
more to create more. This drives up the cost. Thus in-ground
value and finding-plus-developing cost always gravitate toward
each other.6
The structure of prices, costs, and values Table I shows
the layers in the USA in two recent years. Let the reader
beware: first, comparison of any two years is chancy. Second,
some of the statistics are subject to wide error. The "value"
estimates are a fragment from a current research project by G.C.
Watkins and myself. But by looking at actual numbers we can put
some flesh on the bones of economic theory. Then we can look at
long-term changes to gain perspective. I conclude with a
suggested procedure for calculating the value of oil assets used
up in a given year.
Table I. Price, Cost, In-ground Value
Two Recent Years USA
(Dollars per barrel)
1984 1992
1 Gross wellhead price 25.88 15.99
2 Net price (ex operating costs, royalties, 16.67 10.68
taxes)
3 Reserve in ground, market value 6.94 4.71
4 Development cost 3.84 2.87
5 Discovery value (line 3 less line 4) 3.10 1.84
("user cost")
Sources:
Line 1, Department Of Energy, Monthly Energy Review
Lines 2,4, factors from (Adelman 1993,p.248-250]
Line 3, average of "pure oil" market transactions, with no gas
reserves. (From a current research project with G.C. Watkins)
Note. The operating margin (line 1 less line 2) includes 15
percent of the price as royalty. This is no cost, but rather a
share of the profit. Another 5 percent corresponds to excise
taxes, which are in part a charge for services (police and fire
protection, etc.), in part a taking of profit. The true social
current cost is not a third, but less than 20 percent of the price.
However, the in-ground value of the reserve depends on the net to
the owner, not the net to society. The development cost has been
reduced by 11 percent to allow for the tax allowance. Thus lines 2
and 4 are private values, comparable with line 3, and permit the
subtraction of line 4 from line 3 to arrive at line 5.
Factors affecting the cost of holding the asset oil in-the-
ground, to get from line 3 to line 2:
1984 1992
Production/reserves 0.108 0.101
Decline rate 0.096 0.091
Holding time (half life) 6.131 6.574
of asset, years
Annual appreciation in value 0.154 0.133
Riskless rate 0.122 0.062
Production and reserves data from DOE/EIA, decline rate computed by
formula in Appendix 1. Holding time computed from formula
T'=ln(1-(.5Ra/Q))/-a. Riskless rate, from Economic Report of the
President, interpolating between 3- and 10- year Treasury notes.
The traditional industry rule of thumb, that the market
value of an in-ground reserve fluctuates around one-third of the
gross price, or one-half the net, has held fairly well in the
past (see below), but seems to understate today. In the USA, a
reserve barrel is held in the ground for production on average in
6 to 7 years. The increase in value from line 3 to line 2 is
compensation for the investment in holding the barrel. The
measure is inexact, but it is within the range of industry
discount rates. It decreased with interest rates generally as
inflation eased.
The difference between in-ground value of a developed barrel
and its development cost is the discovery value of an undeveloped
barrel, "user cost." It is sacrificed, over and above
development cost, by the decision to develop. Under stable
conditions, it is a proxy for finding cost. When this discovery
value equals or exceeds expected finding cost, it is the signal
for an investment inflow into exploration. Where cost exceeds
value, there is no investment.7
Aside from errors, especially for a residual like Line 5,
domestic oil is getting more scarce. True, development cost per
reserve unit declined from 1984 to 1992. But reserves-added in
1984 were 3.8 billion barrels; in 1992, only 1.5 billion. The
lower marginal costs resulted from discarding the poorer
prospects.8 The supply curve swung to the left. The industry
moved down the curve. Discovery value fell more than development
cost, and, I think, was below finding cost.
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Figure 4 shows diverging development cost trends for oil and
gas since factor supply prices approximately stabilized in 1984.
Of course the supply coefficients are very crude, but I doubt
that better ones would make much difference. I have no
explanation for the divergence. But oil and gas values are set in
very different markets. Gas is a self-contained market, where
prices and costs are mutually determining. But the wellhead price
of oil is set exogenously. It is equal to the world price, hence
the cost is no longer a floor.
Price, cost, and reserve values in the USA-- a test of
depletion theory Table I presented four measures of oil
scarcity, short and long run. Figures 5 and 6 show them over a
long period, but much of it based on inferior data. The year 1948
marked the end of the repressed wartime inflation and industry
distortion.
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A long-run increase in prices and reserve values because of
the fixed stock of "non-renewable resources", etc., would
cumulate over 24 years, even at 2 percent per year, to a 61
percent rise. Since the price level doubled from 1948 to 1972,
the nominal increase--in oil prices, reserve values, and
development costs--should have been by a factor of 3.2. There
was no such thing. Real prices and values actually declined.
Additions to reserves were fairly stable before 1972,
between 2.5 and 4 billion barrels per year. Incremental
development cost fell after 1960, but this was a one-time gain
from gradual easing of wasteful regulation. The stable price,
over and above remaining regulatory waste, was enough to pay for
an inflow of reserves which was slightly greater than the current
outflow. USA oil reserves were in a steady state; production
even grew slowly.
Conclusion on oil scarcity and "scarcity rents" Development
cost is a measure of long-run scarcity. So is reserve value,
which is driven by future revenues. They move in the same
direction, up or down. In the USA, they were steady to declining
for many years, then fluctuated sharply with the price shocks
after 1970.
SCARCITY IN THE WORLD MARKET 1944-1993
Except for the USA and a very few other countries, published
reserves are not well defined, and estimation methods are not
revealed. Year-to-year changes usually do not mean much. But
over several years, changes have meaning, although not precision.
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World reserves (Table II) were first calculated for 1944, at
51 billion barrels. By the end of 1993, the world had produced
and consumed 690 billion barrels, and had 999 billion barrels
left. The worldwide production/reserves ratio is half of what it
was in 1944. Strong conclusion should not be drawn from weak
numbers, but they do not suggest increased scarcity or shortage
at any time.
Most of the net growth has of course been in OPEC. We are
often told that non-OPEC producers will "empty out their
reserves". Very true. Each decade, they use up most of what they
have, and replace it with more. This need not continue forever,
but cost trends show it is a good bet to continue for years. Thus
the value of reserves in the USA is now governed by the
difference between the worldwide price and the level of domestic
operating costs.
Cumulative
Gross Reser'
Reserves at
Cumulative
Gross Reser'
Reserves at
TABLE II
WORLD PRODUCTION & RESERVE-ADDITIONS 1960-1990
(IN BILLIONS OF BARRELS)
1944 1945-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-
OPEC
Production -- 26 55 103 10C
ve-Additions -- 219 251 128 434
End 22 215 412 436 77C
NON-O P E C
Production -- 51 64 102 19C
ve-Additions -- 98 187 114 207
End 29 76 200 212 229
-93 . 1944-93
. 284
. 1032
. 770
. 407
. 607
. 226
Cumulative Production
Gross Reserve-Additions
Reserves At End 51
77
318
291
TOTAL WORLD
119 205
439 242
611 648
SOURCE: Reserves:1944, from History of the Petroleum Administration
for War (Washington, 1947), Appendix 12, Table 1. Later years from
Oil & Gas Journal, annual "World Wide Oil" survey. Production from
DeGolyer & MacNaughton, Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics.
In principle, changes in development cost are an indication
of change in value, in finding cost, and in oil scarcity in
general. If we array, from lowest to highest, development (and
much exploration) investment per unit of new capacity, for each
country outside North America and Western Europe in 1955, 1965,
1975, and 1985, for 1955-1985, there was clearly no strain on
resources. The supply curve moved far to the right. (Adelman
1993, p. 225) The "long lead times" of which we hear so much are
only for exploration in new areas, much like research and
development in manufacturing. There were no wild investment
swings between 1933 and 1973. There was continuous addition to
capacity, which expanded sevenfold while the price fell.
289
640
999
690
1639
999
)|
)
)
I
)
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As for the value of oil in the ground, we have only one
Persian Gulf observation: the value of a new-found barrel in
Saudi Arabia (corresponding to line 5 of Table II) in 1976: 1 - 2
cents per barrel. This is of course a value under monopoly,
related not to price but to marginal revenue, which approaches
zero. (Adelman 1995, ch. 4)
CONCLUSION: CALCULATION OF OIL ASSET CONSUMPTION
Table III sums up two methods, following two theories. The
upper panel treats the resource oil as initially fixed. Hence all
production is a subtraction from it. The estimator follows (but
does not explicitly cite) the "Hotelling rule" (Das Gupta &
Heal), whereby the value of the asset in ground must equal the
current net price. Thus value losses are respectively $66 billion
and $35 billion. A milder version of the method of Panel A is to
subtract total production, but credit output only with a charge
for "resource rent" per barrel, the present value of the
inevitable increase of the limited stock. But, first, there is no
inevitable increase. But if there were any increase expected, its
value is included in the current market value.
The method used in Panel B treats the resource as unknown
and irrelevant. The net inventory (reserve) increased in 1984 by
$3 billion and decreased inn 1992 by $4.5 billion, about 13
percent of the estimate in Panel A.
Obviously I regard the method of Panel A as massive error,
because what came out of the stock was nearly all replaced. The
milder variant, assigning an allowance for resource rent, is a
smaller error. What pervades all variants is the lack of any
reference to investment in oil, of all industries. It is Hamlet
without the Prince or the rest of the cast.9
TABLE III
ALTERNATIVE CALCULATIONS OF OIL ASSET CONSUMPTION IN RECENT YEARS
1984 1992
A. Assumption: an initial fixed stock
1 Liquids produced, million barrels -3813 -3219
2 Net value at well head, dollars per barrel 16.67 10.68
3 Asset consumed, billions of dollars -65.6 -34.4
B. Assumption: reserve as inventory
4 Liquids reserves, net change, million barrels +453 -950
5 In-ground value, dollars per barrel 6.94 4.71
6 Net change in inventory, billions of dollars +3.1 -4.5
Sources: lines 1,4 from DOE, Reserves Annual Report
lines 2,5 from Table I above.
Method: panel A, from Repetto (1989)
panel B, this paper
DEPLETION OF DATA
The asset valuations used are from a current research project by
G. C. Watkins and myself. We hope to have some better numbers soon,
despite serious data and econometric problems.
But we should be clear on the theory. The way to measure the
value of oil assets used up is to multiply the net reserve decrease by
the current market value of a barrel in the ground. A partial measure
is the development cost of such a barrel. The value of a barrel in
ground sums up the expected trajectory of prices, up or down. Because
expectations are uncertain, reserves are risky assets, their returns
discounted at normal risky rates. Reserve values are forecasts made by
qualified observers with an interest in guessing right. The sale of a
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producing lease or of a security concentrates the minds of scientists,
engineers, bankers, and oilmen. They may be and often are beautifully
wrong. But the only basis for disregarding them is to assume that
private markets cannot--somehow--value mineral assets properly.
But much basic data is disappearing. The annual reserves reports
are still of high quality, but not as useful as they were before 1980,
on the basis of API-AGA groups estimating for small areas, year in
year out. Mindless hostility to the oil industry dictated that they be
compiled by government, and the sampling frame is now companies not
areas. Investment and operating costs for oil and natural gas were
last tabulated in 1991; I have extrapolated one year; it becomes less
defensible as we move away from the benchmark. The oil development
issues of the AAPG Bulletin ceased after 1991, both for North America
and outside, and the worldwide investment expenditures tabulated by
the Chase Manhattan Bank ceased after 1987. We are now afflicted with
useless estimates of corporate "finding cost", and of worldwide
capital "needs", invincible against any analysis because sources and
methods are not known, and replication impossible. These pseudo-
statistics will infect and burden all discussion, whether of
sustainable growth or anything else.
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APPENDIX
1 Investment, capacity R is the new reserve to be developed, in
barrels, by investing K dollars. Q is the initial output in barrels
per year, and the investment per annual barrel is K/Q. (It is the
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investment per daily barrel, divided by 365.) With a decline rate of
a percent per year, R = Q f0T eatdt =Q(1-eaT)/a
Decline rate In general, a=(Q/R)-(QeaT/R). With slow decline
over a long lifetime, we can safely neglect the second right-hand-side
term, and a=Q/R. Otherwise, we approximate: e-' T = Qf/Q * Q/R, where
Qf=final output. The theory is that the more intensive the
development, the higher the fixed annual outlays, hence the sooner the
cutoff. Then the formula becomes a=Q/R-(Q/R)2 . A check: Prudhoe Bay
field 1993 output was 10.29 percent of reserves. (Oil & Gas Journal,
1-31-94:82) By formula a=9.23 percent. The Reserves report (1992, p.
29] gives Prudhoe Bay "underlying decline rate" as 9 percent.
2 Expected growth rate and ratio of wellhead price and in-Qround
value As shown elsewhere (Adelman 1993, ch. 13), the expected rate
of price increase is: g = i + a(l-P/V), where i is the interest rate,
a the annual exponential decline rate of production, P the net price,
and V the in-ground value. In the special case of P=V, a is irrelevant
and g = i. But if in fact P=2V, then g = i - a. Recalling Figures 5,
6: if i is the market discount rate on oil investment, it stayed for
many years near the decline rate a. The predicted rate of price
increase was zero, and this was borne out.
3 "Finding cost per barrel of oil equivalent" often cited in the
financial press, this consists of (a) exploration plus development
expenditures, divided by (b) oil reserves-added plus the "oil
equivalent" of gas reserves-added. The number is useless.
The addition in the numerator (a) is illogical. Exploration adds
knowledge and development adds reserves. These are different
activities, for returns over very different time periods. Moreover,
exploration outlays on oil are mingled with those on gas.
The addition of oil to gas in both the numerator (a) and the
denominator (b) is wrong because there is no oil or gas equivalence.
Oil and natural gas are not in a stable relation to each other with
respect to costs, prices, or reserve values. They can and do move in
opposite directions.
Moreover, even if "finding cost per barrel of oil equivalent"
meant something for any one year, it would not be comparable with that
for any other year. Changes in the exploration-development mix, or in
the oil-gas mix, or both together, make comparison invalid. We are
told not to add apples to oranges; this is fruit salad.
4 The Solow contribution Solow (1992, pages 8-12) states:
"Even apart from the possibility of exploration and discovery,
the stock of nonrenewable resources is not a pre-existing lump of
given size, but a vast quantity of raw materials of varying
grade, location, and ease of extraction."
This sounds like but is not a modification of the received
theory. There is said to be substitution between "greater inputs of
labor, reproducible capital, and renewable resources for smaller
direct inputs of the fixed resource." Each year we decide "how much
to save and invest and how much of the remaining stock of nonrenewable
resources to use up. . . . We] have used up some of the stock of
irreplaceable natural resources." (Emphasis added)
The discount rate is "a technical assumption of convenience" and
in any case is "very small." This is consistent with the lack of any
attention to investment in the creation of mineral stocks. Investment
is again ignored in suggesting that:
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"The correct charge for depletion should value each unit of
resource extracted at its net price . . .minus the marginal cost
of extraction. . . . [T]he correct measure of depletion for
social accounting prices is just the aggregate of Hotelling rents
in the mining industry."
This sounds like the method of Repetto (Table II), whom Solow
cites as a source. Solow does not include development investment in
extraction cost. But I think that for national income accounting the
consumption of the asset created by development investment cannot be
ignored, any more than any other type of capital consumption.
Line 5 in Table I, "user cost," is the value of the unit (line 3)
less its current development investment. Line 5 also allows for, and
is an indirect measure of, discovery investment per unit. Both these
investment requirements may change in the future, and make the price
change. But line 3, the present value of an asset to be sold off in
the future, embodies future prices. Thus it catches the elements of
price unrelated to current cost, i.e. rents to the mineral owner.
Solow does not explain "Hotelling rents," whose usual meaning is
the increase in net present value of the shrinking stock. We have
argued that the shrinking stock and its increasing value are phantoms.
In the usual case of decreasing prices, market values, and user costs,
the "Hotelling rent" would be negative. But this does not matter.
Whatever its sign or size, any rent is captured in lines 3 and 5 of
Table I.
1. Despite the protests of some economists and engineers. (See
Lohrenz 1992 on the "X-x fallacy").
2. Zvi Griliches wrote ("Productivity, R&D, and the Data
Constraint", (Presidential address to the American Economic
Association, American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 1, at 16):
"Knowledge is not like a stock of ore, sitting there waiting to be
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mined. It is an extremely heterogeneous assortment of information
in continuous flux. Only a small part of it is of any use to
someone at a particular point of time, and it takes effort and
resources to access, retrieve, and adapt it to one's own use." A
mineral body in the real world is no exception. It is not "sitting
there waiting", but is rather a heterogenous mass of information
needing investment for access, retrieval, and use.
3. Example: Suppose the estimate for a well is an initial 1000
barrels daily, 365 thousand barrels per year. If the decline rate
is 10 percent per year, production after 25 years is only 82
barrels daily, 30 thousand barrels per year. If at current prices
lower output will not pay operating expenses, this is the cutoff.
The reserve will be booked as 335 thousand barrels, its cumulative
expected output. A higher price, or lower cost, will extend the
"economic life".
In algebra, R=QJ0 e" adt=Q (1-e-aT)/a, where R=proved reserves,
Q=initial output, a=decline rate in percent per year, and T=time.
If T is indefinitely large, this simplifies to R=Q/a, or a=Q/R,
which is usually but not always a good enough approximation. For
our example, R=365 (1-e'(25xO.1))/.1=3350.
4. "In the calculable future we shall live in an embarrass de
richesse of both foodstuffs and raw materials. . . This applies to
mineral resources as well." Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Social
ism, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, p.
116).
5. Assume the price of oil is $10 per barrel. One oil well
produces 10 barrels daily, the other 10,000. The average cost in
the big well is only a small fraction of cost in the small well.
But under competitive conditions, the marginal cost in both wells
is $10. In each well, production is pushed to the limit, where
producing one more barrel daily would raise costs on the whole
operation by more than $10. Profit is maximized (or loss minimized)
in both wells.
6. In theory, the contribution of discovery to in-ground value in
any given place ought to stay between an extreme of zero where
available reserves are unlimited, and a maximum of equality with
development cost. (Adelman 1993, pp.243-244] In the USA,
discovery value has long fluctuated around 60 percent of
development cost. Moreover, exploration outlays (omitting bids for
leases, which are not a cost but a sharing of profits) have been
around that proportion of development outlays.
7. I estimated in 1986 [Adelman 1993b, pp. 155-156] that the U.S.
industry would keep shrinking because expected finding cost
exceeded value. This has in fact happened, but there has been such
turbulence that one cannot be sure that the conclusion was borne
out.
8. At any given time, capital expenditures have a non-linear
relation to reserve additions. One plausible relation is
exponential. Then K=eR-1, where K=expenditures in billions of
dollars, R=reserve additions in billions of barrels, and "b" a
coefficient of greater or lesser cost. Disregarding tax benefits,
K(1984)=16.2, R(1984)=3.8, and b(1984) =.72. But K(1992)=4.9
billion, R(1992)= 1.5 billion, and b(1992)=.91, an increase of 26
percent. The precision of these numbers is deceptive. Other
mathematical forms would give other results. But they would all
show a strong increase for oil. Over this period, the coefficient
decreased for non-associated gas reserve-additions.
9. One might ask: why not apply user cost rather than in-ground
market value to place a value on net reserves added or subtracted?
This would under-estimate the loss of assets, which are created by
investment in both finding and development. But the neglect of
development investment in the literature is striking.
